ROBERT MUGABE…WHAT HAPPENED?... ...GABRIEL, BUT NO ANGEL.

ROBERT MUGABE…WHAT HAPPENED?...

...GABRIEL, BUT NO ANGEL.

This year (2012) in  April, I had the occasion,  to sit on post-screening panels of the film,  Robert Mugabe what happened?by Simon Bright. The screenings were at Royal Commonwealth Society, The University of Sussex  and  the Platinum movie house Oxford, as part of the Oxford Documentary Festival.

I have seen a couple of reviews that have been done on both the film  and the post screening discussions. This contribution is not an answer to these previous reviews, but rather an attempt to add to the body of knowledge on it, and give my own thoughts on both the film and questions that have emerged from screening discussions.

My First port of call is  to acknowledge that in spite of whatever imperfections the film might have, it is well made and focuses on a subject that is relevant for Zimbabwe. Given our political environment, public discussions on Mugabe - what is wrong with him and how this came to be, can be fairly dangerous subjects. It is even more dangerous to speculate about what may happen after he is gone. However given the fact that he has held the highest political office for the last generation, his own advancement in age, evident health challenges and the reality of mortality, these subjects are not only relevant but natural and should be engaged in various ways, which is part of what the film does.

The film reads like a concise history book, exposing the public to a nuanced history of the country, from the colonial days, UDI, the struggle for independence to the different phases of post colonial Zimbabwe. In this effort, a lot of audiences benefit from a context that is seldom given when doing an analysis of events in and of Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe. A commendable attempt at balance by the filmmakers, which assists in what is seldom, the context free single story on Zimbabwe and Mugabe himself based on events of the last 12 years.

Given the complexities of Zimbabwe’s challenges, the question has been asked, is it fair to lump everything on Mugabe. In my humble opinion, there is no one who personifies Zimbabwe’s slump, decay, degeneration and collapse into a state of continues crisis, more than Mugabe himself. As a person, who has been at the helm of the country’s leadership for the last 32 years, clearly, all things good and bad have to be laid on his door step. With leadership comes not just the perks but also responsibility, and the responsibility for the crisis in Zimbabwe lies in a lot of places, but none, more than with Robert Mugabe himself. Over the last 32 years, his exploits in turning Zimbabweans into an educated people, and the sunshine phase of post liberation Zimbabwe, do very little to overshadow the fact that in that same sunshine period, there was a political attack that had a clear ethnic slant of genocidal proportions that took place. The fact that the man, clearly had the gift of the garb, does nothing to erase from history the fact that even the first election in a free Zimbabwe was almost called off because of his resort to violence as was the case in many other elections to follow. There is little that his impeccable liberation war credentials can do to erase the fact that besides  claiming to having brought democracy to Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has been the fiercest fighter of peoples freedoms, and an unfortunate turn coat, who has together with his cohorts, betrayed the essence and objectives of the same liberation struggle that he led. In short, in spite of his middle name, Gabriel, Robert Mugabe is no angel.  So yes, it is fair and proper to focus our attention on him, as not just the personification of the crisis in Zimbabwe, but also dictatorship personified.

In light of the above, there is therefore credence to the theory that Paulo Freire and others have posited that in most cases those fighting for freedom are not necessarily well intentioned, that their fight really is to occupy the state and become the next oppressors. No where is this more clearer than in Zimbabwe, where the liberation movement is still in power, and is credited with the biggest crisis that this country perhaps will ever see.

The film  presents to audiences a black and white picture of a person who has changed. Now while this is a commendable effort on the part of the filmmakers, it turns the film into a classic tale of a “ good guys gone bad”. But given what we know of the man and how he has presided over leadership responsibilities, the question needs to be asked if this is an accurate portrayal.  It is arguable that where Robert Mugabe is concerned, there are certain changes and continuities that deserve a closer look than what the film does. It has been argued that people do not change, circumstances do and people adapt to them. Is this not the case, where Robert Mugabe is concerned? The years that we glorify as the good years, the first 15 years after independence, are the same years, where he had his “moment of madness” with the Gukurahundi. These are the same years that we had attempts to have a one party state in Zimbabwe, and where   Mugabe’s government brought us the scourge of neoliberalism through their engagement with the IMF and World bank with catastrophic results for our economy and the nation at large. So is the question really Mugabe what happened? Did anything happen, or there were times when the people of Zimbabwe and the world wittingly or unwittingly turned a blind eye to consistent patterns of brutality, dictatorship,and a short tolerance level to opposition that Mugabe has consistently shown over time.

The film uses a wide cast of journalists, civic society actors, political actors, an academic and a childhood friend to assist the process of thinking through the question of what happened to Robert Mugabe. The critic has been that there is no one who is close to Mugabe who is part of the film. Now, given the circumstances, this is obviously a difficult task,  because those who are close to him are relatively inaccessible, but more importantly, because those who are close to him think the guy has done no wrong. They   believe that the government and Mugabe have no  role  in the malaise that has visited the country, blaming sanctions and everyone else, except themselves and their master. Now what point is there to discuss the question of what happened to Robert Mugabe with them, when they feel that there is nothing that happened to him, and that he continues to be revolutionary leader leading the continental anti-imperialist garrison.  Besides, who can be a better spokesperson for Mugabe, besides  himself, whose utterances and actions are given wide coverage in the film.

Related to the above, questions have been asked about those critiquing Mugabe. The theory that is posited is that the same question that the film asks of Robert Mugabe, can be asked of Professor Madhuku, Dr. Makumbe, Opposition leader Simba Makoni and ZCTU Faction President Lovemore Matombo. But is it even a question worth asking?  Have their transgressions equalled in consequences and scale to what Robert Mugabe has done? Seriously, can Madhuku’s alleged experiments with constitutional manipulation in the NCA be equated to Robert Mugabe’s follies and the ruin that he has placed on a country that was once considered the “ jewel of Africa”? I have no intention of excusing any of the commentators, but there is a real question of comparability that needs to be considered, and frankly,  the assertion that these people are approaching the ‘court with dirty hands’ and should thus shut up, is a poor attempt at shutting down debate on the clearly larger questions around Robert Mugabe. The beauty of that argument is that it acknowledges that Robert Mugabe is  Rogue or has gone Rogue, partly answering the question raised by the film. To seal it off, I believe that it is conventional wisdom that two wrongs do not make a right, and again, in spite of whatever transgressions that Madhuku or Matombo can be blamed for, they do not turn Gabriel Mugabe into an angel.

The film, “ Robert Mugabe, what Happened” is not a perfect film, but which film is? In my opinion the film is valuable addition to the body of knowledge that exists not only on Robert Mugabe but also on Zimbabwe. It defies the notion that is peddled everyday by ZANU PF that suggests that history ended with the liberation struggle. This it does through a wonderful weaving of pre and post independence footage on the man, his struggles and character.

It touches a bit on the land question and to enthusiasts it does this sparingly. Clearly the Land question still remains an open book in our current political and economic discussions. The film does perhaps something that is not expected from a white film maker, living in England, which is to show how in 1979, Mugabe almost stopped the Lancaster house talks over the land issue, only to be forced back to negotiation table through arm twisting by regional leaders. All the while also stating how Britain initially reneged on its commitments on the matter only to later offer support with strings attached. No one disputes this narrative,   progressive or realistic denies the reality of the land reform program, its necessity and inevitability.  As an open chapter, what is left to deal with? There are several things, primary amongst them a land audit to ascertain where we stand on the matter as a country given the fact that we are an agro based economy and to put paid to allegations that some chiefs have amassed more than their share of the land. Secondly, is perhaps the development and deployment of a depoliticised, objective and progressive thinking on the matter, which has been absent, and as a result has led to the continuous manipulation of the land issue as a political weapon based on falsehoods and calculated political manoeuvres.

As a born free, I find the film as a useful narrative on things that I didn’t live through and some, which I was too young to understand. Having said that, this does not disqualify me as a commentator, but rather allows me not to fall into the trap of a time warp where analysis is trapped and restricted only to a current or a historical perspective.

The question that the film raises is  relevant and couldn’t have been asked at a better time. Robert Mugabe, will always be  different to many, revered liberator to some, brutal dictator to others. His contribution to the liberation of the country from colonialism is huge, his sacrifices revered and appreciated. But in spite of all that, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, has certainly been no Angel Gabriel during his long tenure that is now nearing a generation.

Lesotho…some lessons for Zimbabwe

Lesotho…some lessons for Zimbabwe

Lesotho is a very small country, which shares a boarder with only one country, South Africa, which also completely surrounds it.  Because of its relative obscurity on the map, a lot of things go unnoticed in this mountain kingdom, which has a constitutional monarchy. Of the few times it has grabbed the worlds attention, it has often been on the back on unsavoury political upheavals, coup plots, attempts and actual coup d’états a history that only ended in 1998, after SADC ( led mainly by South Africa and Botswana) intervened.

The recent elections that brought to an end Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili are no doubt going to consider a key moment in Lesotho’s own democratic progress, given its soiled history. But even more important are the lessons that the historic election carries for the rest of the region, especially Zimbabwe, which has a troubled electoral history, and which will be headed for an election in the next 12 months.

It is clear that Lesotho is the latest addition to the barrage of nations who have taken their places as part of new wave of democratization. The election, while not perfect had some valuable lessons that countries like Zimbabwe can glean in terms of how to run an election, how to have collaborative partnerships with the international community, How Civic Society and official election management bodies can aid each other in pursuit of shared goals, and also how political parties can also collaborate to ensure that regime change takes place.

Given its political history which is littered with military interventions and meddling in civilian political processes, one of the biggest take outs from the last election in Lesotho is around the role of the military. What was the role of the military in these elections? Nothing. The Military in Lesotho has been able to reform itself from being a meddler and spoiler of democratic processes to a professional force that understands that they are entrusted with the very crucial role of protecting citizens with no major role in the electoral processes. A clear study in contrast with some elements of the Zimbabwean army, who have refused to accept the professionalism and loyalty to country not individuals that is demanded by their station. Choosing instead to operate as political commissars of ZANU PF, and their blant instrument of choice in repressing the people and their will as expressed in elections. This military madness by  just a few high ranking military officials is credited with saving ZANU PF from exiting the state in 2008.

Part of the analysis that is given where Zimbabwe is concerned is that, in 2008, had Mavambo, MDC N and MDC T bandied together, there is very little doubt that the defeat of ZANU PF could have been more decisive that it was, and there could be a different governmental configuration as we speak. The opposition bodies in Lesotho learnt that lesson well, and have been able to turn a seeming defeat into a victory by the opposition forces led by the All Basotho Congress (ABC).  Had the ABC and its 4 counterpart parties not taken this route, the Basotho Congress led by Former Prime Minister Mosili would still be in power today.  The lesson is therefore clear, that political parties in Zimbabwe, especially those other than ZANU PF, need to be aware of themselves and what they can be able to achieve as unitary elements, and see whether their collective intentions are not met better by a coming together of these different forces to face ZANU PF as a common force fighting a common enemy.

Another clear lesson from the Lesotho process is one that is meant for ZANU PF itself. It is a lesson that was given in October of 2011 by the Zambians, when Former President Rupiah Banda accepted electoral defeat paving the way for the ascension to power of President Sata. Mosisli’s acceptance of defeat, especially after his party clearly led on a party by party basis is a not only commendable but surely something that ZANU PF should be able to use to check themselves in the future. Part of the challenge that is there in Zimbabwe is largely because in 2008, the incumbent Robert Mugabe refused to accept defeat to a clearly more popular Morgan Tsvangirai. By 2008, cases of incumbant’s accepting electoral defeat on the African continent were few and far between, but what Lesotho, Zambia and Ghana have given us are close examples not only on the continent but in the region that this is possible, and for those who take this noble route, it has been proven so far that there is life after the presidency both for the former occupier of this institution and for the country.

Given Zimbabwe’s fear of foreign observors, Lesotho was able to show that seeking help in electoral processes and welcoming foreign observors is something that can assist in not only lending credibility to your processes but also in just ensuring that the electoral process is free, fair and effectual in terms of people expressing themselves and that the world can see this. The coordination effort of international observers that was led by the UNDP in Lesotho clearly showed the above. In addition to the above, the last Lesotho election also showed that Election Management bodies, have nothing to fear from civic society, and that if anything their collaboration can be something that is good for the integrity of the electoral process. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in Lesotho worked closely with NGOs to conduct voter education, knowing that it lacked both the human resources and technical expertise, though they had the money. Zimbabwe’s own ZEC needs to take heed of this, and accept that they have nothing to fear except fear itself from accepting the help of clear talented groups like the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZSN) and the Elections Resource Centre (ERC). Civic society advocacy programmes and dialogues have helped in facilitating electoral reforms.

So inspite of its size, its own economic challenges and the fact that some of its citizens would rather integrate with South Africa, the “tiny” kingdom of Lesotho, has giant lessons for fellow landlocked SADC country Zimbabwe.

The Political Weaponisation of Disorder … ...reason for Zimbabwe’s predatory polity

The Political Weaponisation of Disorder …

...reason for Zimbabwe’s predatory polity

At the dawn of the new millennium, two scholars, one French Jean Pascal Daloz and the other hailing from London, Patrick Chabal, put together an interesting framework for the analysis of politics and political developments in sub-Saharan Africa. In their book, ‘Africa Works – disorder as political instrument’, they define a phenomenon they call the political instrumentalisation of disorder, as “when politicians maximise their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and chaos”. The foregoing definition and their further explanations on their framework of analysis is instructive for any one keeping a close eye on Zimbabwean political developments, and informs part of the analysis attempted below.

Disorder, is defined as a state of confusion or disruption of systematic functioning and neat arrangement. Similes to it include words with negative connotations like chaos, confusion, mess, disarray, shambles, turmoil, lawlessness, anarchy, and ruckus. Disorder is generally discouraged and considered to be an undesirable state, one, which is frowned on and looked down upon. In both Zimbabwean popular and traditional culture “ kushaya order” (disorder) is a damning indictment that can be detrimental to ones chances of love, getting a job, passing at school or generally doing well in many aspects of life. Not so in Zimbabwean Politics.

The undesirable state of disorder, is not just the order of the day, but is actually desired, and where it is absent, it is created or manufactured to ensure political gain.  To borrow Andreas Schedler’s phraseology, disorder is seen as a ‘valued horizon of attainment’ and not a ‘feared horizon of avoidance’. As such, in Zimbabwean politics, disorder seizes to be just a state of being, but a formidable weapon and instrument, especially in the hands of those who are anti-reform, anti-democraticratisaion, anti-change, anti-efficiency, in short…anti-order. In Zimbabwe’s polity, disorder becomes the social equivalent of a medical virus  - undesirable but not too harmful, until it is weaponised. It is this weaponisation of chaos and disorder in our politics that has often proved it hard to correctly understand the state and its main actors and their seemingly illogical decisions, political moves and even survival. Often times, Zimbabwe, as a political question has defied orthodox political theory, and even common sense. This is because the political weaponisation of disorder of necessity demands that common mores of logic and common sense are suspended because of the political windfalls that have accrued to those sponsoring anarchy and disorder.

In Zimbabwe , it has emerged clearly, over the course of a decade, that the merchants of disorder in our politics are primarily the hawks resident in ZANU PF. There are a thousand and one examples that can be sighted as a way of showing cause to the foregoing assertion. Take for instance the conduct of elections in Zimbabwe. Since the year 2000, the process of conducting elections, which ordinarily is supposed to be a systematic, predictable (in terms of process and not the outcome) and orderly process, has often been thrown into deliberate turmoil by bureaucratic bungling, political manipulation of integral processes, the introduction of political violence as part of the process, and of cause the disregard for basic rules of the electoral game. All the above, have thrown, not just the processes of elections, but the entire country into turmoil.

Of late a clear example of the weaponisation of disorder has been the COPAC Led constitution making process. In this process ZANU PF, has deployed its weaponised form of disorder from the get go. Remember the chaos that characterised the 1^st All stakeholders Conference from the 13^th to the 14^th of July 2009. From the bussing in and coaching of a disruptive and retrogressive political vanguard to make unreasonable submissions during the Outreach process, to the sponsoring of disruption on seemingly technical grounds, with clear political intent of disorder, during the drafting process and the submission of new issues post COPAC agreement on a draft. The intent, in all these actions, has been a deliberate attempt to sponsor disorder.  The stating of the bussing and coaching of people during the COPAC process, may insinuate, wrongly, that the deployment of disorder as a political weapon is the province of lumpen elements. Not necessarily. The transformation and deployment of disorder as a political weapon in Zimbabwe’s polity has primarily been the domain of studied political actors, scientists and practioners, who know exactly what they want to achieve through it. Pseudo academics of the ilk of Jonathan Moyo and Tafataona Mahoso have been the primary promoters of disorder through their empty arguments bent on a disruptive politics disguised as intellectual thought.

The Global Political Agreement of September 15 2008 and its resultant governing arrangement has also fallen victim to this retrogressive politics., disorder was carefully deployed to ensure that no progress is made with regards to meaningful implementation of the agreements that the three political parties represented in parliament entered into with the facilitation of the South African Presidency and SADC. The deployment of a weaponised form of disorder is also what has constantly stalled talks between the parties, implementation even of areas agreed on, and it is why Professor Author Mutambara is still Deputy Prime Minister in spite of being rejected by the people of Zengeza in elections on March 29 2008, and being rejected by members of the Political Party that he led at Congress in 2010. The political weaponisation of disorder is why President Robert Mugabe will agree to act on outstanding issues in private with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, and then publicly act against the agreements. What is worse is also the public denouncement of violence and then in turn, condone, through inaction, acts of violence by members of his political party.

In the Zimbabwean polity, the deployment of a weaponised form of disorder for purpose of capturing and retaining power is not only relegated to the orthodox political field. It has since been transmitted to civil society (including the church and organised civil society). If one is a member of a social movement or NGO, they don’t have to look very far, sometimes, to see how “democratic” actors in democratic and progressive processes in these entities are constantly deploying disorder. But the most glaring example comes from the Anglican Church, where the illegitimate Bishop Kunonga, has adopted a very potent brand of politically sponsored disorder to deal with a legitimate and clearly more popular and more progressive Bishop Chad Gandiya. The instrumentalisation and weaponisation of disorder in the Anglican church has mirrored unfortunate trends from the orthodox political space, which include, but are not limited to, the politicisation of religion, the employment of violence in church matters, the barring of gatherings, and allegations of murder.

However, having made a clear case of the existence of this phenomenon of the instrumentalisation and weaponisation of disorder in our politics, the question that it begs is, to what end and is there a logical explanation to these clear deviations from basic social mores? Unfortunately, there is some rationality to these seemingly irrational actions, and a clear method to the madness that politically weaponised disorder presents. There are many reasons for the deployment of politically weaponised disorder where our politics and polity are concerned; I will mention only three here.

Firstly politically weaponised disorder in spite of some rational to its deployment is not premised on the need to reach some rational ends. The deployment and pervasive presence of disorder is in it self both a means and an end. It is a means to the stalling of progressive action and an end in that chaos as a state of affairs is generally where rogues come into their element. Political rogues thrive in situations of crisis and chaos, and would prefer that chaos to order on any day, because it allows them to act with impunity and continue with their shady dealings under the cover of anarchy. As such even when some arguments are sponsored to promote the disorder, you can be rest assured that this is a case of the devil quoting scriptures; the intent is not to make you a believer but to sway you from the path of righteousness. The most persuasive and reasonable arguments presented to deal with what would have been presented by way of argument, will not make the merchants of disorder move an inch, because what they want is the chaos itself, through the perpetuation of the politics of loud “NOs” devoid of reason.

Secondly, politically weaponised disorder is meant to halt democratic development and progress, leaving the status quo intact. This reason is principally because the assassins or gravediggers of the democratic order know that they benefit the most from limited movement and a return to the status quo. In context, ZANU PF has got no reasons to see the value of a new constitution. They see no value on implementing the reforms that the GPA promotes, which subsequent SADC resolutions of Maputo (November 4 2009), Livingston (March 31 2011), Windhoek (May 23 2011), Sandton (June 12 2011), and Luanda ( June 1 2012 )entail. Changes do not benefit them, and as such their disorder is deployed as a weapon to maintain the status quo, which presents them with continuous opportunities to being part of the state without upsetting the patronage system and the patron that are already in place.

Thirdly, the deployment of politically weaponised disorder creates uncertainty. Uncertainty itself becomes a good ally for assassins or gravediggers of the democratic order because of the benefits that it presents. Opponents in such a situation waste their time trying to get certainty on key issues. In Zimbabwe’s case the issue of when a draft will come out, when a referendum will be held, and when elections will take place, are issues that are shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. The intent would be to spring surprises on everyone (because of the sponsors of disorder’s sole proprietorship of key knowledge and information) while they are busy with trying to find certainty under conditions of uncertainty that have been deliberately created by disorder.

The notion of politically weaponised disorder is neither a new phenomenon nor exclusive to Zimbabwe, as Chabal and Daloz explain, it is an Africa-wide phenomenon. In spite of its prevalent use and sponsorship on the continent, politically weaponised disorder has always been defeated by a constant focus on enforcing order by progressives. In as much as you do not fight lies with lies (you fight them with the truth and truth doesn’t lie), disorder cannot be fought with disorder, it is best fought by its anti-thesis, order.

Order, in Zimbabwe’s case, entails the constant focus on reforms, constant campaigning to see processes through rather than hijacked or halted midway. Most importantly it entails exposing the merchants of disorder for who they are and what they stand for – retrogressive elements bent on standing still when there is a fire catching up with us and our natural instincts tell us to move on and survive. Such predatory and disorderly instincts do not bode well for the promotion of our country from its current state of democratic, economic and social disrepair to a more sane and progressive order.